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LONG-TERM TRENDS IN PUBLIC CONCERNS IN TWO SOCIETIES
1
Rachel Kats
University of Haifa
ABSTRACT
Trends in public concerns from the early 196 0's to the mid-1970's
are compared for Israel and the United States, relating changes in
concerns to historical and social change which occurred during the
decade in both societies. The analysis is based on open-ended questions
regarding views of either personal or nation's future -- hopes and fears
for that future -- and a Self-Anchoring Rating Scale, by which the
respondent evaluated personal and nation's situation in various time
perspectives. The Israeli's future perspective became centered around
peace and war, removing other issues to a secondary plane of concern.
In contrast, the American became more concerned about social issues.
The most striking difference in the evaluations of self and society was
that the Israelis revealed in the seventies a personal depressive mood,
while the Americans were at that time more pessimistic about their
society's situation and future.
The purpose of this paper is to compare public concerns in two
societies, Israel and the United States, at two time periods, the
early 1960's and the mid-1970's. The basic question asked is: How
do different populations react, as evinced in their concerns, to what
happened in their lives and country over the course of more than a decade?
The idea of subjective concerns as monitors of social change has
received ample attention (Land, 1971; Barnes and Inglehart, 1974; Parke
and Seidman, 1978). A general assumption has been that objective change
leads to change in subjective indicators (Turner, 1971; Rokeach, 1973;
Campbell, 1976); or, following Weberian tradition, a mutual relation-
ship is postulated (Lipset, 1963).
As several authors have noted, comparative studies combining a
long-term and cross-cultural perspective are less in evidence (Pierce
and Pride, 1972; Rokeach, 1973; Campbell, 1976; Andrews and Inglehart,
1973). This lack is due to, besides limitations of resources, the
difficulties involved in capturing macro-social change -- its
complexity, extent, and duration, and its relation to the change in
individual attitudes (Kats, 1982). In addition, a cross-sectional,
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cross-cultural comparison introduces its own source of error and bias:
when patterns characterizing a nation as a whole are overaccentuated,
variations between relevant segments of the population and their
influence on those patterns may be overlooked (Pierce and Pride, 1972;
Rodgers and Converse, 1975). Micro-level analysis, on the other hand,
may lead to ecological fallacies. Sampling errors and their effect on
the interpretation of results may be compounded in cross-cultural
research over time, since populations in different societies not only
vary as such, but may also change in divergent ways (Duncan, 1975).
Nevertheless, as advocates of the cross-cultural approach to the
study of subjective social indicators argue, only cross-cultural
research can adequately "reflect the recent economic and social history"
(Barnes and Inglehart, 1974) and provide the proper perspective (Pierce
and Pride, 1972). Phenomena in different societal systems are comparable
when the same operational measures are used -- provided these are valid --
and culture-bound concepts can be distinguished adequately (Andrews and
Inglehart, 1979).
The subjective social indicators used in the present study were
developed by an adherent of the cross-cultural approach -- Hadley Cantril --
and proved itself appropriate for an overall comparison of public
concerns in a wide range of countries. Repeated use of Cantril's method
in two focal countries osfered an opportunity to study and compare long-
term trends in concerns.
The two societies selected for comparison -- Israel and the United
States -- are characterized by both similarities and dissimilarities. Of
major importance for the topic of this paper is the fact that since
the early 1960's, when relative calm seemed to prevail in the world,
both countries have gone through "major national events" (Bradburn,
1969: 42 -- war, economic upheaval, social turmoil -- which are likely
to cause change in people's concerns, otherwise affected mostly by
their more immediate personal life situation.
One of the major assumptions in the analysis of the Israeli data
was that the rankorder of importance of concerns would remain relatively
stable over time (Antonovsky and Arian, 1972; Rokeach, 1974; Kats, 1982);
that only the most salient public issues, those related to major
societal problems and change, could be expected to change in accordance
with the objective trend (Turner, 1971). When the assumption is
extended to a cross-cultural comparison, the hypothesis might be made
that the more stable concerns are basic human concerns, which are
similar in different societies, while the varying concerns reflect
changes in the societal system and in ideologies.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIXTIES
What were the major trends of change in the two countries over
this decade which are considered to forR a frame of reference against
which people's concerns were patterned?
Israel's population increased by about 50% from 1961 to 1974,
relatively a much more rapid increase than occurred during the same
priod in the United States (about 15%). This was due to a high rate
of both natural increase and immigration, and accompanied by a rise in
the Arab share of the population. Emigration increased as well.
In both countries the decade was dominated by war. In Israel,
the wars of 1967 and 1973 added new dimensions -- occupied territories,
terrorism -- to already existing defense problems, and they overshadowed
other international developments of importance. Opposite Israel's
military power, there emerged the economic and political power of the
neighboring Arab countries, the growing importance of the PLO. America
in the 196 0's was dominated by its involvement in Vietnam, which not
only had a traumatic impact internally, but also changed the position
of the United States on the international scene. Shortly before the
second survey was conducted, the Middle East crisis introduced the oil
embargo and the subsequent energy crisis.
Politically in Israel, the decade of the 1960's has been
characterized as one of "dynamic conservatism" (Eisenstadt, 1977;
Lllemers, 1981) with continuation of political leadership and institutions.
Yet it was a period in which the national consensus seemed to erode:
rivalries and conflicts arose within parties; new leadership emerged
(Elazar, 1973). In America, the political climate became one of increasing
"issue awareness" (Abramowitz, 1980), dissent and protest by groups
seeking equality in the Great Society, with descent into rioting and
political assassination (Watts and Free, 1978). Closer to the second
survey, the political corruption of Watergate brought disillusionment,
and changed the relation of the people to its leadership.
Although Israel remained economically far behind the United States,
which in the sixties reached an unknown affluence and technological
development (Campbell, Converse and Rodgers, 1976), its economy too
large leaps ahead and its standard of living increased accordingly.
Except for 1965-67, unemployment remained relatively low. At the same
time the inflation rate reached new proport ons toward the second
survey and other economic problems emerged. Material aspirations rose
but income gaps widened. In America, the steady growth in affluence and
welfare halted toward the end of the sixties, and serious pro lems of
inflation and unemployment arose for parts of the population.
Socially, the sixties were for Israel a period of consolidation
and further development. But, more troublesome trends also appeared;
problems of the environment, crime, or drugs were less widespread than
in the United States but felt more in the smaller country (Greenberg,
1979). Questions of Jewish and Israeli identity were brought into focus
by such events as the Eichmann trial and the aftermath of the Arab
wars (Antonovsky and Arian, 1972; Eisenstadt, 1977). The pioneering
Zionist-socialist ideology seemed on the retreat, replaced by a
present-oriented, competitive materialism and a self-confident belief
in Israel's power that was seriously challenged only by the October War.
A declining work ethic, combined with a deterioration in labor relations,
in interpersonal relations, and in public morality, were other social
trends (Greenberg, 1979; Keren and Goldberg, 1980). The years brought
increasing differentiation and stratified pluralism to Israeli society,
notwithstanding the unifying effects of war. The rising standard of
living served not only to create aspirations but to make inequalities
more sharply felt (Cohen, 1980; Deshen, 1980; Smoohah and Peres, 1960).
America in the 1960's experienced a decade of "civil rights movement,
social experimentation and criticism" (Simon, 1974). Welfare programs
and revolutionary changes in the position of groups such as Blacks and
women, proved to be insufficient and created, as in Israel, discontent
and frustration. These and other disturbing and divisive social problems
of the post-industrial society, like alienation or invasion of privacy,
affected the self-image of the American, as well as trust in the
leadership (Watts and Free, 1978; Abramowitz, 1980).
METHOD
The indicators employed in the study are those developed in the
early 19 60's in an international study by Hadley Cantril. In order to
measure subjective perceptions of the "reality world," Cantril asked
his respondents two basic sets of questions. The first set consisted
of open-ended questions asking the respondent to describe in as much
detail as possible h~s personal situation and that of his country in
ideal circumstances. Similarly, he had to relate to the worst
imaginable situation. In the second set, the respondent was to
consider the extreme situations he had described as ends of an 11-
point "ladder" ranging from 10 to 0, the so-called "Self-Anchoring
Striving Scale," and to rank self and country on this scale. This
ranking had to be done for three points in time: five years before the9
interview, at the time of the interview, and five years in the future.
Thus, feelings of optimisor pessimism, progress or frustration,
were able to be measured.
The present analysis bases itself on data from two Israeli and two
American surveys which used these two sets of questions. The surveys
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in each country were conducted at similar periods. In Israel a national
survey was conducted for Cantril by the Israel Institute of Applied
Social Research at the end of 1961 - beginning 1962 (Antonovsky and
Arian, 1972). There were 1,170 respondents. At the beginning of 1975,
a replication of that study was made among an urban sample of 531
persons. This number corresponded with the 1'79 respondents in the
first sample who lived in the same cities. The American data have
been reproduced from Watts and Free, State of the Nation III, whick2
reports on a series of national surveys using Cantril's questions.
For present purposes, data tor 1964 and 1974 are compared; these are
based on surveys conducted, respectively, by the Institute for InternationE
Social Research and Potomac Associates.
Although the survey questions were translated into Hebrew for the
Israeli studies, and Israeli respondents mentioned some specific topics,
Cantril's original coding scheme was generally applicable without arousing
special reliability problems. Intercoder reliability at the two stages
was, respectively, 95% and 84% (Antonovsky and Arian, 1972; Kats, 1982).
FINDINGS
Generally, the Israeli respondents revealed a downward trend in
the mentioning of personal hopes: a more limited range of hopI was
mentioned, and the percentage expressing each hope decreased.
"Immediate" issues like standard of living, one's own health, happy
family life, and children's prospects, remained highly ranked on the
list, but the dominant hope became the wish for peace. Except for the
hope for a decrease in army service -- extensive after the war period --
no new issue came to the fore (Table 1).
The personal hopes of the American generally increased; however,
although the three major aspirations of the 1960's -- standard of
living, children's future, and personal health -- retained their
primary importance, they also declined in salience, as they did in
Israel. In fact, on thes14 issues the personal concerns of Israelis
and Americans converged.
There is another difference between the personal aspirations
of Israelis and Americans. The former concentrated on a happy family
life and on peace; the latter contended with a new set of social
issues: the hope for economic stability, more honest government, more
social justice, less crime and violence, and more international
cooperation. These issues, much less or not at all mentioned by
Israelis, probably reflect America's social unrest, reactions to
Watergate, and a concern about the nation's position in the world.
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Table 1. Personal Hopes, Israel and U.S.A., by Period
(Percentage mentioning topic)*
Israel U.S.A.
1962 1975Z 1964 1974
Topic Mentioned N = (779) (531)
Aspirations for children 48 % 19 % 35 % 24 %
Higher or decent standard of living 46 25 40 29
Personal health 33 22 29 28
House, apartment 31 14 12 11
General concerns for family, relatives 28 6 * 7
Family health 26 10 25 11
Leisure, recreation, travel 24 7 5 9
Happy family life 23 21 18 15
Good job, congenial work 19 8 9 11
Modern conveniences 19 **
Employment 15 8 6
Peace 14 36 17 16
Self-improvement 14 9 - -
Having own business 9 - -
Freedom from debt 8 - -
Being a normal, decent person 7 - -
Job providing self-development 7 - -
Happy old age 6 * 8 8
Success in one's work ** 8 0* 5
Peace of mind, emotional maturity " 7 9 9
Having wealth 5 5 8
Economic stability, no inflation " 5 " 15
Less army service - 9 -
Better world, international cooperation "*8
Better, more honest government/politics - - 10
Social justice, elimination of discrimination - - * 7
Safety from crime and violence - - 6
Personal ethical/religious problems - - 6 5
Christian revival - - * 5
* The Israeli data for 1962 are based on an urban subsample, comparable
to the 1975 urban sample; source: Israel Institue of Applied Social
Research. Tables from Kats (1982) are reprinted with permission of
Tavistock Publications. The data for the U.S.A. are based on national
samples; source: Institute for International Social Research, 1964;
Potomac Associates, 1974; and reprinted, from Watts and Free (1978),
with permission of Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company.
For the Israeli data a difference of at least 9% between periods was
statistically significant (difference between proportions)
• Mentioned by less than five per cent
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Table 2. Personal Fears, Israel and U.S.A., by Period
(Percentage mentioning topic)
Israel
1962 1975
(779) (531)Topic Mentioned
Personal ill-health
Lower, inadequate standard of living
Ill-health family
War
Dependence on others, old age, loneliness
Unemployment
Children (inadequate opportunities)
General concerns for family, relatives
Unhappy family life
Uncongenial work
Economic instability, inflation
Specific impact of war, terrorism
Army service
Social decay, moral disintegration
Lack of freedom (of speech)
Lack of integrity in government/politics
Crime
42 %
35
30
28
20
1714
11
10
5
20 %
20
11
38
6
10
5
* 9
- 8
25 % 25 %
19 16
27 12
29 18
6
14 12
10 10
8
" 26
9
* * 6 6
-- - 9
* Mentioned by less than 5 per cent
Personal fears, too, were mentioned less frequently by Israelis in
1975 than in 1962 (Table 2). Only war-related worries became more salient:
the fear of war, its specific impact, terrorist attacks, and prolonged
army service. These concerns drove others deeper into the background.
Nevertheless, as with hopes, the most salient of the personal fears --
ill health and a lower standard of living -- remained highest in rank-
order after the fear of war. The economic concerns of Israelis received
a different nuance: the fear of economic instability became more pro-
nounced, a rather obvious consequent of the inflation rate of that time.
Inflation seemed to have affected the American more immediately, how-
ever; for him it became a major concern, ranking first with ill-health. 1 5
Yet, despite large-scale unemployment in America in the early 1970's
personal fear of unemployment of the American exhibited stability over
the decade. Watts and Free (1978) attributed this to the fact that un-
employment hit only specific groups in the population.
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U.S.A.
1964 1974
Reflecting personal hopes, social issues became more prominent
in the personal fears of Americans. In Israel these issues were mentioned
by very few. Only in the two major fears of ill health and decline in
the standard of living did the Israeli resemble the American in the
mid-seventies. As for other personal fears, the percentages in 1975
were even lower for Israelis than for Americans, a reversal of the
1962 situation, when Israelis expressed more fears.
The greatest contrast between Israel and the United States was
in national hoes: a drastic reduction in Israel; an increase in the
United States (Table 3).
Peace (in Israel, usually meaning peace with the Arab countries)
remained the foremost national hope of the majority of Israelis. In
the States, peace was also the highest ranking issue; but it declined in
importance from 51% to 27% and, despite Vietnam, was of much less
national salience than it was in Israel. This Israeli concern for
peace removed most of the national issues from the mind, as it did on
the personal level, except for the hope for a higher standard of living.
The latter and the hope for economic stability replaced a concern for
productivity and technological advance, which had been prominent issues
in Israel in the early sixties. Furthermore, only some concern about
immigration, public morality, and national unity retained their salience
among Israelis. The first indicated perhaps a worry about the decline in
immigration; the last seemed to reflect discontent and doubts of the
period after the October War.
In the United States peace and a higher standard of living ranked
in 1964 as high in importance as they did in Israel. These two concerns
were followed in rankorder by the hope for employment and the elimination
of discrimination, issues of relevance at the time. In 1974, when the
Vietnam war had ended, as had Watergate, the American had become more
preoccupied with domestic issues. Not only did integrity in politics and
inflation rank highest among national hopes, but generally -- in contrast
to Israel -- social issues gained in salience: social responsibility,
efficiency in government, law and order, democracy in government, public
health, ecology. The American clearly held more aspirations for his
society than did the Israeli, who wanted above all to be left in peace.
Although the October War had somehow lowered the expectation among
Israelis that a new war would erupt soon -- the fear of war with the
Arabs decreased from 50% to 8% -- it left at least two immediate
national fears: of the destruction of the State (mentioned by 17%)
and the burden of continuing army service. Otherwise only the two
economic issues, of inflation and an inadequate standard of living,
retained a certain salience as national fear. No further internal
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Table 3. National Hopes, Israel and U.S.A., by period
(Percentage mentioning topic)
Israel U.S.A.
1962 1975 1964 1974
Topic Mentioned N = (779) (531)
Peace 74% 72 % 51% 27 %
Productivity, technological advance 48 7 - -
Population, immigration 36 12 - -
Decent, higher standard of living 33 23 28 11
Economic stability, no inflation 19 15 5 24
National independence, economic self-
sufficiency 19 8 6
Increased exports 17 - - -
Political stability, national unity 14 11 9 15
Military strength 14 5 - -
Employment 12 " 15 10
Change in electoral system 11 - -
Elimination of discrimination 10 5 15
General education 10 -
Cultural standards 9 - -
Public morality 8 11 10 10
Adequate housing 8 - -
Free secondary education 7 * -
Status of nation 6 - -
International cooperation, better world 6 " 6 *
Social responsibility, common good 6 * 5
Interpersonal relations " 6 - -
Efficient government * 5 " 11
Integrity in government/politics * 25
Law and order * 11
More democratic, representative government 5
Public health * * 5
Improved ecology 
- 5
Change of presidents 
- - 12
* Mentioned by less than 5 per cent
issues seemed of importance to the Israeli public (Table 4).
The American pattern bears witness to the internal troubles and
the energy crisis that the United States as a whole had experienced
by the second survey. War, which in 1964 was of major importance as
-717-.
Table 4. National Fears, Israel and U.S.A., by Period
(Percentage mentioning topic)
Israel
1962 1975
(779) (531)Topic Mentioned
War
Lower, inadequate standard of living
Economic instability, inflation
Political instability, national disunity
Increased taxes
Population, lack of immigration
Low productivity
Unemployment
Materialism
Army service
Lack of public morality
Isolation from other nations
Dishonesty in government/politics
Loss of democratic government
Inefficient government
Communism
Destruction of state
Too centralized, powerful government
Threat of communist power
Lack of law and order
Pollution
Food shortages
8o % 46 % 50 % 24 %
17 14 * 6
13 15 13 28
11 9 8 12
10 - -
9 7 - -
8 * -
7 5 6
* 10 - -
• 5 6 6
* 5 - -
8
* * 5 7
* - 22 8
- 17 - -
- - 8 *
- - 7 5
- - 5 13
- - * 6
- - * 6
* Mentioned by less than 5 per cent
in Israel, now ranked only second after the economic worry of inflation.
The Cold War had ended; fear of communism, second in importance in
1964, lost most of its salience. Reflecting national hopes and in
contrast to Israel, the worry over internal political and social
conditions, even though mentioned by a minority, has increased or,
at least, not declined in salience.
The reflection of these trends in concerns from the mid-sixties
to the mid-seventies in the average ladder ratings -- the views of
past, present and future of self and nation -- shows the differences
in outlook between the Israeli and the American in yet another way
(Table 5 and Figure 1).
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U.S.A.
1964 1974
Table 5. Mean Ladder Ratings, Israel and U.S.A., by Period*
Past Present
to to
Past Present Future Present Future
Personal
Israel 1962 4.8 5.5 7.0 + 0.7 + 1.5"
1975 5.7 4.8 5.6 - 0.9 + 0.8
U.S.A. 1964 6.0 6.9 7.9 + 0.9 + 1.0
1974 5.5 6.6 7.4 + 1.1 + 0.8
National
Israel 1962 4.0 5.6 7.5 + 1.6 + 1.9
1975 5.7 5.6 7.5 - 0.1 + 1.9
U.S.A. 1964 6.1 6.5 7.7 + 0.4 + 1.2
1974 6.3 4.8 5.8 - 1.5 + 1.0
' Based on the Self Anchoring Scale
• A difference of 1.0 in a rating was considered statistically signi-
ficant for the Israeli data (difference between means, Kats, 1982),
of 0.6 for the American data (Watts and Free, 1978)
Both personal and national ladder ratings in the early sixties
showed an upward trend over time: the present was considered better
than the past, and expectations were even higher for the future.
Generally, the ratings for Israelis on both ladders, were below the
level of those for Americans. On the personal level, the slope from
past to future was somewhat more even for Americans than for Israelis.
In the national ratings, Israelis revealed a stronger optimism: the
slope for Israelis was straightlined and steeper than for Americans.
Israelis in the early 1900's, then, viewed their past -- perhaps
realistically so -- relatively low compared to Americans; but having
experienced rapid progress toward the present, they tended to project
this evaluation onto an optimistic view of the future, in which,
potentially, much could still be realized (Antonovsky and Arian, 1972).
The Israeli respondents tended to view their personal past in a better
light than that of their country, and the present about the same; but
the national future looked rosier than their own. For the Americans,
the opposite was true: they considered their own past worse off than
their country's, but both their personal present and future better off.
The mid-seventies see a turn in the tide. The mood in Israel had
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1962
1975
present future
1964
1974
past
4.0
present future
FERSONAL RATINGS - ISRAEL
8.0
7.0
6.o
5.0
past
4.0
19F2
1975
present future
PERSONAL RATINGS - U.S.A.
6. 197P6\.097
past
\ pee
present future
NATIONAL RATINGS - ISRAEL NATIONAL RATINGS - U.S.A.
Figure 1. Trends in mean ladder ratings, 1960's and 1970's, Israel and U.S.A.
(Sources: Institute for International Social Research, 1Q64;
Potomac Associates, 1974; Israel Institute of ADplied Social Research
1962, 1975,
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r.y. mean
rating
past
become depressed; in particular, the personal present was seen as more
negative than in the past. Hope in the future was not lost; people
still expected improvement, personally and nationally. On the personal
level, however, their future aspirations were lower than in 1962.
Remarkable enough, the national present was ranked about the same as
in the past. Regarding the national future, the Israelis remained as
optimistic in 1975 as they were in 1962.
The personal ratings of Americans in 1974 followed parallel trends
to those in 1964, only at a lower level. Americans showed no drop in
their evaluation of the present as had the Israelis. For the Americans,
that happened nationally: the present was clearly evaluated lower than
in the past; but, although the future was again rated higher, the level
of 1974 fell under that of 1964. National present and future, in contrast
to the sixties, were also ranked far below personal present and future.
Finally, comparing the Israeli of the mid-seventies with the
American of that period: the former saw his personal present and future
clearly at a lower level. The American, by contrast, ranked his nation's
present, and even more so its future, lower. The American had become as
pessimistic about the preseq0 and future of the nation as the Israeli had
become about personal life.
DISCUSSION
Public opinion is difficult to link directly and causally to events.
Yet the results of the surveys reported here suggest a response to
events preceding the surveys in both countries, as well as to some of
the basic trends which developed in their economic, political and social
life. This response is revealed most clearly in the changing patterns of
concerns of major salience. Of course, answers to open-ended questions,
in particular, tend to follow normative issues of concern, the "headlines.'
Such possible bias in the data, however, does not explain all of
the difference between the two countries. A variety of generalized
characteristics of the Israelis have been advanced to explain why they
remained occupied with the down-to-earth daily problems of personal
health, family, and economic situation and seemingly left unattended
many social issues that one might have expected to bother them. These
characteristics, which existed in 1962, but seemingly became more promi-
nent in 1975, included complacency, narrowness of scope, provincialism,
and lack of social consciousness or responsibility (Antonovsky and Arian,
1972; Eisenstadt, 1977; Greenberg, 1979). It has also been suggested that
these attitudes may reflect a defensive or hardeining reaction, a way
of coping with the stresses under which the Israeli constantly lives
(Rokeach, 1973); or, that the Israelis concentrate on the basic concerns
because the problems of their country are too large and complex to
comprehend, and as such are for the government to come to grips with,
not for them.
The difference with the Israelis on this plane can be exaggerated;
however, the Americans show themselves in this and other studies to be
relatively more socially concerned. This is seen as being due to their
more activist, participatory orientation, to a confidence in their
ability and responsibility to influence and change their government and
environment, and to a tendency to criticize (Abramowitz, 1980).
If the personal optimism of the American can be understood by a
generally adequate life situation, despite problems (Watts and Free,
1978), then the national optimism of the Israeli, given the situation
in 1974, raises more questions than does the personal pessimism. Does
the national optimism express loyalty to country -- not allowing the
Israelis mentally to be as pessimistic as they are about their personal
life? Or is a traditional Jewish cultural trait being expressed here:
hope for better times, which remained alive throughout the centuries,
not for the person, but for the people?
The Israelis' national image, central symbol of identity, and their
aspirations, have always been extended to utopian dimensions in order to
enable them to live in a world of uncertainty (Jacob, 1974; Eisenstadt,
1977; Greenberg, 1979). The symbol is related to a belief in the
impossible, the miracle. The Israelis can imagine many bad things to
happen to them personally, but they cannot afford to be doubtful about
their country, the only thing which keeps them standing in a hostile
world. Being doubtful for the Israeli does not mean doubting the things
the American does; it means fear for the existence of Israel itself. The
Americans may have been shocked by objective occurrences; but despite
the manifestation and extent of economic and social problems, their
basic existence was not felt threatened, the way it was for the Israelis.
Thus the Americans may seem gloomy when asked about their country;
personally, though, not too much has changed.
At the outset of this paper, it was postulated that, in both the
United States and Israel, socially responsive concerns would change
according to the social change experienced, while more general human
concerns would remain more nearly constant. The data revealed a complex
response, in both the changing salience of concerns and the personal
and national evaluation of reality. On some issues, Israelis seem to
have progressed along the line of development suggested by Cantril
(1965), their concerns converging toward those in the more mature
American society, which has reached a stage of questioning the
achieved. Otherwise, events and developments seem to have led to some
directional change, partially confirming the general hypothesis. Though
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differently expressed, each country displayed a mood of depression at
the time of the 1970's surveys.
The years since then have brought a drastic change in the political
constellation of both countries, a new war. The extent to which these
and other changes are a consequence of the concerns expressed, and
possibly are remolding the public's hopes and fears, is a topic for
further research.
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helpful comments of A. Antonovsky, H. Chaiklin, A. Goldstein and
J. Shuval. Special thanks are due to A. Antonovsky, A. Arian and the
Israel Institute of Applied Social Research for the opportunity to
use data from their 1962 survey; and to Lexington Books, D.C. Heath
and Company, Lexington, Mass., for its permission to reprint data from
b.Watts and L.A. Free, State of the Nation III, 1978.
2 For analyses of trends in public concerns in each country, see,
for example, for Israel: Antonovsky and Arian, 1972; Jacob, 1974;
Greenberg, 1979; Kats, 1982; for the United States: Simon, 1974;
Campbell, Converse and Rodgers, 1976; Watts and Free, 1978.
3 Spechler (1980) argues that a vast country like the United
States, with abundant human and natural resources, cannot be compared
with a small, isolated country that lacks these assets. Cantril (1965)
thought of the United States as a well-developed, mature society,
while Israel was on its way to becoming a Western-modelled society,
"headed in the same direction but at a slower pace" (Greenberg, 1979).
In the latter's view the United States form a major model for Israel,
and Israelis tend to stress similarity in problems and values.
Cantril (19(5: 43) classified the United States in the early
sixties as a well-developed, industrialized society, with an unequalled
standard of living and further expansion in health, education and
culture. Israel, at the time, he considered as having a high standard
of living, rapidly developing further. For recent reviews on developments,
see, on Israel: Greenberg, 1979; Keren and Goldberg, 1980; Spechler,
1980; on America: Watts and Free, 1978; Abramowitz, 1980).
5 Until 1973 the Gross Domestic Product growth rate was high
compared to other industrialized countries, including the U.S.A.;
Private consumption showed an 8.7% annual increase (Antonovsky and
Arian, 1972).
6 After 1973 the increase in GDP dropped. Labor costs as well as
government expenditure increased, the balance of international
currency was negative (Spechler, 1980).
7 In 1974 the per capita Gross National Product declined for the
first time, inflation reached 22%, the dollar was devaluated, and
millions of people faced unemployment (Watts and Free, 1978). The
Israeli's real income may have lagged behind that of the American
worker, but he still enjoyed employment security and a range of
social benefits. In contrast to the United States, family life
remained "stable and intensive" (Greenberg, 1979: 77).
Sample question: "All of us want certain things out of life.
When you think about what really matters in your own life, what are
your wishes and hopes for the future? In other words, if you imagine
your future in the best possible light, what would your life look like
then, if you are to be happy?"
9 Sample question: "Here is a picture of a ladder. Suppose we say
that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you
and the bottom represents the worst possible life for you; where on the
ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time?"
10 Though criticism has been raised about the validity and
reliability of these questions, they have proven to be sensitive
indicators of concerns that are of general salience for the public,
and as such they have been used repeatedly (Watts and Free, 1978;
Kats, 1982).
The first was a multi-stage national sample of Jewish citizens,
aged 18 and over, drawn from the voting registers; the 1975 study was
a systematic random sample, drawn from postal zipcode lists and based
on sampling within household units of Jewish citizens aged 20 and over.
The second sample had slightly younger, more Israeli born, and higher
educated respondents, reflecting population changes, but was otherwise
comparable.
12 Data regarding sample size in the American surveys could not be
obtained. Usually national samples ranged between 1100 and 16OO.
13 Generally, in 1962 the Israeli had on the average "many more
things to say" than did the American (Antonovsky and Arian, 1972: 13),
and was more hopeful -- a function of national hopes. Though differences
in coding operations were not excluded, the authors offered three other
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explanations: the verboseness of the Israeli people, the plethora of
events experienced by the young nation, and a stronger identification
by the Israeli with the nation than by the American. By 1974-75 the
concerns of the Israeli had become more limited, in both volume and
range, whereas those of the American had increased to the extent that
they now exceeded somewhat those of the Israeli. A partial explanation
may be that in Israel in 1975, the pertinent questions were part of
a larger omnibus survey, which may have suppressed details in the
answers. The changing picture, however, seems rather to be a function
of less optimistic views held by the Israelis in 1975. Though Israeli
respondents still expressed more hopes than fears, these hopes had
been reduced in scope. In contrast, Americans mentioned more hopes
than they had earlier.
14 Watts and Free (1978: 173) explain the decline in importance of
a higher standard of living by a partial fulfillment of aspirations,
yet a repression of hope through failure to advance. The decrease in
concerns for family and children is attributed to frustrations over the
young.
15 A reason for this may be that Israeli government policy has
kept unemployment at a low rate and at the same time has adjusted
wages to the pace of inflation. Neither is the case in America.
16 As later surveys revealed (Watts and Free, 1978: 206), this
national ebb in America was not a passing mood.
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